PEER PRESSURE AND PEER LEARNING IN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES

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# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRR</td>
<td>Country Review Report</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>IRM</td>
<td>Independent Reporting Mechanism</td>
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<td>LEITI</td>
<td>Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>MSG</td>
<td>Multi-Stakeholder group</td>
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<td>MSI</td>
<td>Multi-Stakeholder Initiative</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NEITI</td>
<td>Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NPoA</td>
<td>National Program of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGP</td>
<td>Open Government Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIIA</td>
<td>South African Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report examines three prominent Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) – the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Open Government Partnership (OGP) through the dual lenses of peer learning and peer pressure. The term “peers” implies a degree of equality between the participating parties. Peer review is defined as examinations that are systematic in their nature, of a state by another state(s), specifically designated institutions or a combination of the two. In MSIs, peer reviews are premised on mutual trust, non-confrontation, and the principle of non-coercive persuasion. The ultimate goal is to help member states improve their policy-making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles.

While the APRM has the necessary structures and mechanisms to conduct this type of peer review, they are not used as much as they could. The reports published by the APRM include best practices, which are meant to be examples of successful policies, providing case studies of what is working well. However, in their current state, these best practices are inadequate for other APRM members to learn from them and/or to replicate them. The official body that conducts peer reviews, the Forum of Heads of State and Government Participating in the APRM (APR Forum), has also not lived up to its potential. High-level attendance has been poor, reviews have been short, and the feedback unbalanced, consisting mostly of leaders praising each other’s achievements. APRM reviews have previously identified the potential for electoral violence in Kenya, xenophobia in South Africa and resurgence of political violence in Mozambique. However, the APRM did not exercise peer pressure to prevent these dangers from escalating into full-blown crises.

In its shorter history, the OGP has already been more successful than the APRM in subjecting its members to peer review, both in terms of learning and pressure. One example is the OGP’s Peer Learning and Support Subcommittee. Its mandate includes helping other members through peer exchanges and mentorships. The OGP also adopted a Response Policy in 2014 to safeguard civil society involvement. The OGP has used this policy to declare Azerbaijan’s membership “inactive,” effectively suspending it on May 4, 2016 for closing space for civil society organizations.

As with the OGP, peer review is embedded in the EITI process and member states claim that it enables sharing their experiences with their fellow member states. This helps to make the process non-adversarial and to facilitate dialogue. Various peer exchanges are also a formal part of the EITI at both bilateral and multilateral levels. During these exchanges, representatives from member states discuss results from EITI implementation and exchange best practices. The EITI protects civil society space in its member states. The Rapid Response Committee investigates reports of harassment and intimidation and provides recommendations to the EITI Board for possible action.

Finally, there is the question of what MSIs do to deal with recalcitrant members. The APRM is the weakest out of the three in this regard. The mechanism does not envision tough sanctions for non-compliance and refers vaguely to “measures” which may be – but have not yet been – taken. The OGP is more effective and suspends members through declaring their status as inactive. This is a “naming and shaming” sanction, which could affect the members’ international status. The EITI goes a step further with mechanisms for suspending and delisting. The EITI can temporarily suspend countries for failing to make progress, missing reporting deadlines, or political instability. Delisting is a far more serious measure, which revokes the country’s membership in the initiative. Based on this analysis, the OGP and EITI have been successful in promoting peer learning and have exercised peer pressure when necessary. The APRM, however, lags significantly behind its counterparts.
INTRODUCTION

Founded on principles of voluntarism, learning from each other, and involvement of civil society, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the Open Government Partnership (OGP) prioritize openness and transparency through the implementation of and adherence to common standards. All three Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives (MSIs) do so by bringing together different actors – governments, civil society, and the private sector – in both national and international forums.

This report examines the role that peer relations play in each MSI, specifically with regard to peer learning and peer pressure. It starts with a discussion of these concepts, to enable a better understanding of what MSIs can achieve. It analyzes the frameworks for peer learning and peer pressure that are included in the APRM, EITI, and OGP and unpacks peer relations within them. It then proceeds to discuss the mechanisms for when peer pressure fails and states become non-compliant, including practical examples. The report concludes with recommendations of what the three MSIs can learn from each other. Although the APRM has the term “peer” in its name, it has been the least successful in promoting peer pressure and peer learning. The EITI and OGP have both incorporated peer learning on various levels and applied necessary peer pressure to recalcitrant members.

DEFINITIONS

There are different understandings of what peer review entails. In this report, peer review refers to systematic examinations of a state by another state(s), specific state institutions, or a combination of the two. Peers are equal in stature and peer reviews are premised on mutual trust, non-confrontation, and the principle of non-coercive persuasion. Signing up to an MSI, given its voluntary nature, makes a country a member of a club with other countries, all adhering to the goals of improving governance, transparency, and accountability. However, in reality countries may have other goals and agendas, such as legitimizing their regimes, attracting aid or investment, or achieving a certain status in their regional, continental, or international context and community.

MSI peer reviews are characterized by mutual dialogue and interactive investigation but can also take the form of questionnaires designed to assess the state being reviewed. The goal is to help states improve their policy-making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles. One of the first times peer review was utilized in international relations was by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), although these reviews were not as comprehensive as those of the MSIs discussed in this report, especially the all-encompassing and ambitious APRM. The benefits of governmental peer reviews center on collaborating to achieve common goals through lesson learning and sharing best practices. They also provide an important forum for government officials to discuss these governance issues and challenges. An added value in MSI peer reviews is that they bring civil society into the process, giving them a voice and allowing them to serve as a counterweight to government.

The effectiveness of peer reviews relies primarily on the influence and persuasion exercised by representatives of the states undergoing the process. Specifically, the process can give rise to peer pressure through formal recommendations and informal dialogue, public scrutiny, comparisons, and even ranking among countries. The competitive element varies greatly between the three MSIs examined here. The founding members of the APRM, for instance, created it with the idea of different countries, at different levels of democratic and socio-economic development, moving towards common goals at different speeds. The APRM, by design, does not rank members against each other or rate them. Its focus is on the spirit of mutual support and collaboration. The EITI is similar in its approach, although it does rate member

3 As well as the impact of all of these factors on public opinion, national administrations, and policy makers. Ibid.
states on whether they are a candidate country or one that is compliant with the Standard. It has also used awards and prizes to encourage friendly competition among members. The OGP could be seen as the most competitive MSI since transformative commitments are awarded a “star.” Like the EITI, it also recognizes countries and initiatives at regular prize-giving ceremonies.

Peer review can directly or indirectly improve policy dialogue, increase transparency, build capacity, and promote compliance, but it assumes participants will act in good faith. More importantly, it assumes development problems mostly derive from lack of resources and/or capacity, an assumption which does not hold true for all countries that have signed up for MSIs.

**PEER LEARNING AND PRESSURE**

The MSIs covered in this report are international organizations whose strengths depend on the collective will of their members. Value sharing, commitment, mutual trust, and credibility are all important factors that contribute to effectiveness. People’s perceptions about all of these elements make peer pressure hard to quantify or measure. Moreover, members of these initiatives are not as equal as the term peers implies. Power relations between participating governments are unequal. At least informally, some Northern countries use the OGP and EITI as diplomatic tools to achieve their aims by, for example, encouraging countries in the South to open up political space for civil society. The APRM is the only MSI of the three that is purely an example of South-South Cooperation.

Yet, this does not mean that the APRM is free from power plays. South Africa, for instance, played a key role in creating the mechanism and hosts its Secretariat. However, during its review in 2006-2007, the South African government was defensive and reluctant to take advice and criticism from other African states. South Africa also wields influence over the process as one of the biggest funders of the APRM. Likewise, Ethiopia attempted to dominate the process for a number of years when its former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, was the chairman of the APR Forum, its highest decision-making body. Zenawi suppressed the public release of the country’s Country Review Report (CRR), contravening APRM rules. The concept of peer pressure is subject to politics on different levels: bilaterally and multilaterally. Peer pressure in these MSIs is applicable mostly in two instances: non-compliance with the framework of these mechanisms and limiting the space for civil society.

**APRM**

The APRM adopts a holistic view of governance, prioritizing four broad thematic areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. Established in 2003 as a voluntary mechanism, it currently has 37 members, 21 of which have completed their first reviews, with two (Kenya and Uganda) undergoing second reviews (as of March 2018). The APRM is open to all 55 AU member states.

The primary purpose of the APRM is to “foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerate regional and continental economic integration through the sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs of capacity building.”

The APRM recognizes that many African states suffer from similar problems and provides a way for them to be solved collectively, through mutual learning. The APRM is built on the understanding that Africans hold the solutions to their own problems. It emphasizes dialogue between stakeholders—principally governments and civil society—at the national level to obtain a balanced analysis of the governance landscape and the challenges the country faces. The APRM Statute (2016) emphasizes achieving its goals

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4 Pagani, op cit.
6 Ibid.
through “sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practices.” The APRM’s Memorandum of Understanding – the document all acceding heads of state sign – mentions “improvement of the quality of governance in other participating countries through peer learning and sharing of experiences.”

APRM documents refer to over 90 international and African standards that must be adhered to. Member states agree to adapt these to their countries, to improve their governance in alignment with the standards set out in these documents. However, there have been exceptions, notably Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea, which questioned the promotion of neo-liberalism and notions of Western-style democracy. None of the APRM’s other members challenged these views, at least publicly.

The APRM’s main body for exercising peer pressure and peer learning is the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government, known as the APR Forum. It consists of all the African Heads of State and government that have acceded to the APRM and assumes overall responsibility for the process. The APR Forum is required to oversee mutual learning, create a constructive dialogue between African states that are a part of the process, and ensure the credibility of the APRM. African leaders have not always prioritized APR Forum meetings, with as few as three heads of state attending previous meetings. Authority is often delegated to APRM Focal Point Ministers, who do not have the same political clout and do not critically engage in peer reviews. Judging by post-Forum communiqués, even heads of state are reluctant to criticize each other.

Peer reviews seem unbalanced, as leaders mostly praise each other’s achievements rather than provide constructive criticism. APRM Country Review Reports (CRRs) contain short records of what transpired at Forum meetings, which highlight the focus on praise rather than criticism, for example: “Prime Minister Zenawi [Ethiopia] noted that Kenya’s Report was a clear indication that APRM is flourishing and clearly crystallizing into a jewel in the crown of NEPAD [the New Partnership for Africa’s Development].” Recent Forum communiqués on country reports not yet publicly available continue the trend of overwhelmingly positive feedback.

The time allocated for peer review meetings is rather short. The first reviews of CRRs for Rwanda and Kenya, both of which took place in The Gambia in June 2006, took a mere two hours each. The former is 184 pages and the latter 301 pages. While there is no formula for determining how long a meeting should be, based on the length of the report it is unlikely that this was sufficient. Furthermore, there are no indications that APR Forum members discussed these reports elsewhere. At the January 2017 Summit, the first reviews of Chad, Djibouti, Senegal, and Kenya’s second review were handled in a single session,

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9 “APRM Memorandum of Understanding,” op. cit.
10 “APRM Base Document,” op. cit.
12 “The President of Mozambique congratulated Rwanda and noted that it is impressive to see that corruption is not a big issue in Rwanda”; “President Blaise Compaore praised the high standard of the [Algeria] Report and the pertinent intervention by President Bouteflika”; “President Museveni praised President Boni Yayi [Benin] for his presentation and the high quality of the report”; “The President of Benin noted that the [Uganda] report was very clear on the progress made and it is clear that President Museveni [of Uganda] is moving in the right direction.”
13 “The APR Forum congratulated President Guelleh on the review of Djibouti and his commitment to the APRM process.” (Communique issued at the end of the Special Summit of the APRM Forum, http://www.aprm- au.org/viewNews?newsId=95, accessed 16 September 2017) and, “Kenya was applauded for being the first APRM Member State to undertake the second generation review and President Uhuru Kenyatta was also lauded for his leadership in the integration and development of the Eastern Africa Region.”
precluding deep discussions on each report. While it is understandable that schedules are tightly packed during AU Summits and heads of states have to reflect on the main points of reviews, more peer learning needs to take place systematically and at different levels of government. A key limiting factor is that usually the Forum takes place directly after NEPAD meetings, which often run late thus taking up Forum time. Concerns have also been raised at the lack of senior researchers participating in peer review missions, a problem that became evident in the second peer review mission to Uganda in November 2017.

The APRM’s “Best Practices” provide material for sharing and lesson learning and highlight policies that work well and could be replicated and adapted by others. The intention is for APRM states to learn from one another, by providing examples or models of how to implement successful governance practices and norms. "Best practices have the potential to anchor peer learning and the sharing of ideas, which the APRM promotes."15 While they have the potential to provide templates for adoption of common approaches and practices, as well as encourage peer learning and exchange of ideas, they are not used enough for these purposes by the continental APRM structures or member states.

There are two main problems with peer learning in the APRM. First, the best practices are presented in the APRM CRRs as one or two paragraphs, or one page at most. The information thus provides a mere summary without an explanation of how it contributes to APRM goals and objectives.16 This information is insufficient for APRM members to learn from or replicate. While some best practices are useful, others seem to have been included for the sake of including something positive about the country. Identification and documentation of best practices is also not part of review and implementation procedures.17 Their inclusion seems an afterthought, intended to balance criticism rather than a means of encouraging other member states to learn from successful policies.

Secondly, best practices are not well disseminated among APRM members. There are no official forums to discuss best practices by APRM members from the same Regional Economic Communities (RECs), for instance, where they would probably be most applicable. Thus, while the policy-learning element potentially exists in the APRM through the concept of best practices, learning from early adopters or imitation is absent from official guidelines. It is up to the official APRM bodies to do more to encourage policy exchanges but also the responsibility of individual members to do more to highlight and promote their own best practices and to approach their peers to find out more about theirs. To utilize peer learning to its potential, more needs to be done at all levels: continental, regional, and bilateral.

Ghana, the first country to undergo APRM review, has initiated peer learning activities in West Africa, although this has not been sustained. Apart from that, civil society organizations (CSOs), such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), have been responsible for much of the early peer learning in Africa.18 Since 2017, the APRM Secretariat has started organizing an annual methodology forum to share experiences and encourage new members to accede.

There are further concerns that the APRM may be watered down to make it less adversarial and potentially threatening to existing and potential member states. These fears emanate from a joint APRM-African Governance Architecture Experts’ Workshop in March 2017,19 which raised the idea of changing the term peer pressure to peer persuasion, along with the goal of universal African APRM accession.20 Mandatory membership would undermine the process. Voluntary commitment to undergo review instills the review process with credibility, signaling a conscious choice to reform. Research suggests that more

13 Petlane & Gruzd, op cit.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 This has included workshops for countries to share experiences and lessons learned as well as training sessions where civil society representatives give each other advice on how to conduct specific activities based on what transpired during their national processes For more on the work of SAIIA’s Governance and APRM Programme, please see: http://www.saiia.org.za/programmes/governance-and-aprm
19 The APRM-AGA Experts’ Meeting was held from March 5-6, 2017 at the premises of the APRM Secretariat, in Midrand, South Africa.
20 “Towards universal accession” became the theme for the APRM’s 15th Anniversary celebrations in 2018.
open African countries have produced better and more honest CRRs and have also been more successful at introducing some governance reforms.21

Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, is leading a process on AU reform, which proposes an expanded mandate for the APRM. The AU has proposed a “repositioning of the APRM to play a monitoring and evaluation role for the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Agenda 2030” as well as “revisiting the APRM questionnaire in sync with current development frameworks including the AU Agenda 2063 and UN SDGs.”22 This is an important opportunity for the APRM to reposition itself to monitor African governance and streamline continental reporting on various initiatives.

There are also concerns that, in line with the points raised above, this could be used to drop controversial questions and indicators, making the process less confrontational and ignoring key governance gaps. Furthermore, technical and capacity challenges need to be overcome. Terence Corrigan and Steven Gruzd of SAIIA argue that “[t]he APRM has not shown the operational ability thus far to meet the challenges of a monitoring role for the SDGs and Agenda 2063. It would require an enormously enhanced APRM system to conduct frequent and regular reviews of multiple countries, produce reports [in a timely manner] and ensure that progress and regression can be followed.”23 These researchers are right to be cautious about the expanded mandate. While it has the potential to improve not only the MSI itself and streamline African data collection, monitoring, evaluation and statistics, the APRM does not have a demonstrated capacity to take on these responsibilities and might have to seek out partnerships with other data collection and monitoring and evaluation bodies. Structured relationships with key research institutions across the continent would be important as well.

OGP

The OGP was established in 2011 by eight founding members (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States). It aims to create partnerships between governments and civil society to improve governance and accountability by promoting transparency, empowering citizens, fighting corruption, and harnessing new technologies to strengthen governance. The OGP supports domestic initiatives to increase openness in governance. This focus gives transparency, empowering citizens, fighting corruption, and harnessing new technologies to strengthen

to take on these responsibilities and might have to seek out partnerships with other data collection and monitoring and evaluation bodies. Structured relationships with key research institutions across the continent would be important as well.

Peer learning in the OGP is an important strategic objective of the initiative along with direct country support, civil society engagement, independent reporting, and external communications. Peer learning and exchange are embedded in the OGP’s mandate, which prioritizes three objectives:

1. To provide the content that allows members to effectively share experiences, innovation and learning across the Partnership, including at regional meetings and events;
2. To ensure that, as an initiative, the OGP is continuously learning and improving in order to provide better support to participating countries and civil society partners; and,
3. To develop ways of monitoring OGP’s progress and tracking impact, both at country and global levels.25

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One practical example of the OGP’s dedication to peer learning is the Steering Committee’s Peer Learning and Support Subcommittee that oversees OGP’s peer learning and exchange strategies. Subcommittee members are encouraged to assume leadership roles in organizing some of these activities, especially in their own countries and regions. For instance, through peer exchanges, the United States provided mentorship and support to the governments of Sri Lanka and Nigeria, both of which have recently joined the OGP.26 Pressure to conform to commitments shared by others also meant that Ghana finally passed a bill guaranteeing citizens’ rights to information, which had previously stalled in the Cabinet for years. A March 2017 OGP Steering Committee retreat included a discussion of new ideas on facilitating peer learning, such as “sharing digital tools, study tours, open government fellowships, and helping build smaller networks where stakeholders could be more willing to open up and share their real challenges than at major public OGP event.”27

Table 1 below outlines activities that the OGP uses to promote peer learning and peer exchange:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Task</th>
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<tr>
<td>Global summit and regional meetings</td>
<td>Work closely with event hosts to develop event themes, identify invitees, design agenda, and facilitate peer exchange workshops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic working groups</td>
<td>Liaise with working group leads to provide input and support, review annual work plans, and assess progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exchanges</td>
<td>Facilitate bilateral exchanges between countries to share practical experiences on particular issues or challenges that both countries are tackling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webinars</td>
<td>Organize regular, interactive webinars to provide coaching, learning resources, and share experiences across participating countries.</td>
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Source: Compiled by authors using information available on https://www.opengovpartnership.org

There are also examples of bilateral peer learning exchanges which have taken place through the OGP:28

- Mexico-Georgia Study Visit, August 2014: The Federal Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection of Mexico organized a study visit for representatives from Georgia’s Ministry of Justice, Parliament, and civil society. The visit helped the Georgian government to learn from Mexico’s experiences in developing and implementing its right to information program in line with international best practices.
- US-Sierra Leone Peer Exchange Event, August 2014: The United States and Sierra Leone participated in a daylong event on the margins of the US-Africa Leadership Summit in Washington DC. American government officials from various departments and agencies presented their approaches to open government reform along with suggestions to Sierra Leone as it began implementing its National Action Plan (NAP).


• Brazil-Tanzania Videoconference, November 2013: Brazil shared lessons with Tanzania from its experience of drafting and implementing access to information legislation. The exchange helped Tanzania prepare for the challenges of passing similar legislation.

Furthermore, there are examples of regional or continental peer learning exchanges. For instance in 2015, Ghana joined Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Tanzania to form an African OGP caucus. Together they gathered to discuss, share, and fine-tune ideas and experiences in developing their countries, with a focus on region-specific challenges that could hinder the implementation of their respective NAPs. Behind the scenes, these interactions are becoming more regular and are strengthening OGP implementation.

Peer learning is also included in the reporting and implementation process, an aspect where, as discussed above, the APRM really struggles. OGP reviews are conducted every two years, with the last six months dedicated to creating NAPs for the next OGP cycle. Members of the OGP develop a self-assessment report and to ensure checks and balances, and an Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) researcher produces a separate, independent report. The IRM process ensures that there is an objective, public assessment of each participating government’s progress toward fulfilling its OGP commitments. The primary aim of these reports is to promote dialogue, learning, and continuous improvement at the country-level. The IRM works closely with the OGP Support Unit to ensure that IRM findings are continuously used to inform the guidance provided to both government and civil society.

Peer pressure also plays an effective role in the OGP. Joe Foti, Director of the IRM in the OGP Support Unit, argues that peer pressure is real and important. “If Nigeria outperforms South Africa, that’s a big deal.”29 Soft diplomacy in the OGP process includes “behind the scenes work” to encourage states to become more transparent and open up space for civil society. Foti sees international peer pressure as particularly important in this regard. The OGP recently added a “Response Policy” in 2014. Emanating from concerns about closing civil society space, it has two objectives: to assist a country to overcome difficulties and to help re-establish an environment for government and civil society collaboration and safeguard the Open Government Declaration, which new members have to endorse prior to joining,30 and to mitigate reputational risks to the OGP. The policy is triggered when the Steering Committee, the chair of the Criteria and Standards Subcommittee, or the OGP Support Unit receives a letter of concern regarding a situation of relevance to the OGP in a participating country. Any Steering Committee member (either government or civil society), multilateral partner, or CSO working on the OGP at the national or international level can submit such a letter.

Azerbaijan illustrates this point well. When the OGP Steering Committee declared Azerbaijan’s membership inactive, effectively suspending it, on May 4, 2016, it cited the restrictive treatment of CSOs as the main reason. The committee, however, acknowledged that there was limited progress in easing some of the regulatory frameworks that prevented civil society from operating freely. This decision gave Azerbaijan 12 months to address legislative and practical obstacles for civil society’s operations and active participation in the country’s OGP process. On June 28, 2017, the steering Committee extended Azerbaijan’s inactive status by another year.31 The OGP’s Response Policy and investigation was triggered after three CSOs raised concerns about restrictions for their counterparts.32

The OGP Steering Committee also uses diplomatic outreach to congratulate or “nudge” countries as needed; the OGP organizes public events to ask countries to share examples of concrete results with their peers; and the Support Unit administers the annual Open Government Awards competition to reward success and innovation. These awards include three winners, four honorable mentions, and one

29 Joe Foti, Program Director: Independent Reporting Mechanism, Open Government Partnership, Interviewed on 9 November 2016 in Washington, DC.
special recognition for a youth-led initiative. At the OGP Summit in Paris, France, in December 2016, first prize was awarded to Ukraine's ProZorro, an online public procurement platform, created to make government tenders transparent. The second prize went to an Indonesian database of election information, while the third was given to an initiative that promotes transparency in the construction sector in Honduras.

The OGP has a clear and direct strategy in terms of peer learning and peer pressure. It was developed with a significant emphasis on peer learning in mind. The OGP seeks to connect government and civil society reformers across participating countries and to create opportunities for them to learn from and inspire each other by exchanging ideas and technical support. It is important to note that this is done at most stages of the OGP process. The OGP has been decisive in applying peer pressure, particularly through its "response policy." This is in stark contrast to the diplomatic statements and inaction of the APRM Forum, discussed earlier. The OGP is a much younger initiative than the APRM, but it appears more dynamic, more willing to evolve and put in place new structures and practices. The APRM Secretariat staff have previously engaged with their OGP colleagues in bilateral meetings and attended OGP Summits. This signals a potential element of peer learning between the initiatives. While this cannot necessarily be attributed to cooperation between the two bodies, it is a fact that recent APRM reviews have been conducted more expeditiously, taking months rather than years, which was previously typically the case. For example, the country review mission for Uganda’s second review was fielded from October to November 2017, and the country was reviewed in January 2018.

**EITI**

The EITI was launched in 2002 by the UK then-Prime Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. It became operational in 2003. Governments, civil society, and companies established twelve principles to set minimum transparency requirements in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. The main reason for creating the EITI was that many resource-rich countries were unable to transform their wealth into developmental benefits for their citizens. There are 51 EITI members as of January 1, 2018, although six of them are currently suspended.

At its core, participation in the EITI is about increasing transparency and accountability in the extractive industries’ sector. In many EITI member countries, revenues from extractive industries simply do not add up – often due to corruption. Transparency is achieved through annual publication of what the companies pay in taxes, royalties, and bonuses to a government, and the subsequent reconciliation with what the government claims to have received. In some cases, increased transparency through the EITI has led to financial gains for federal budgets. In Nigeria for instance, the Nigerian EITI (NEITI) identified missing payments, mostly from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, of almost $10 billion. After publication of the audits, $2 billion was recovered for the Nigerian federal government.

Accountability is a second major component. In an in-country accountability process, a Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) oversees EITI implementation. The group is crucial to ensuring that the EITI is implemented according to the global Standard, which was introduced in 2013 and updated in 2016. This Standard is used for reporting company payments and government revenues in the extractive sector. The MSG also adapts the standard, as relevant, to the specific needs of the implementing country. Liberia’s EITI processes include the forestry sector; Togo’s include water; Nigeria’s and Iraq’s include figures on the physical production of oil and gas; Mongolia’s records environmental costs; Peru’s includes payments to subnational levels of government; and Ghana’s includes the spending by these subnational governments. There are

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numerous other variations on the core EITI model and the initiative encourages innovations by member states. The EITI promotes a flexible approach but insists on a common global standard with brand reputation and credibility.37

MSGs are an important element of ensuring participation of stakeholders from different interest groups in the national process. However, much depends on how they have been set up and how they function in individual EITI member states. For instance, MSG meetings in some countries have suffered from low government participation and uneven representation from civil society and companies. The EITI in Tanzania illustrates this well. Attendance of government representatives at MSG meetings has been very low. Furthermore, there are issues with representation, particularly from oil and gas companies, small and medium sized businesses, and artisanal miners. This not only creates communication difficulties across sectors, but also poses a challenge to implement recommendations agreed to in the EITI reports.38

Eddie Rich, Deputy CEO of the EITI Secretariat, emphasizes the importance of peer learning in the EITI process, saying that they see it as preferable to training. The biggest differentiator is that countries take the lead on discussing specific topics and sharing their experiences with their fellow member states. In fact, new members are told that they are joining a family of best practices.39 This helps to make the process non-adversarial and to facilitate dialogue between stakeholders that had previously not interacted with each other. This is particularly important in fragile environments of post-conflict states such as Liberia where multi-stakeholder platforms brought together hostile parties and reduced tensions among them. Liberian EITI (LEITI) reports about the payments of mining and logging companies to the government were taken up and discussed widely throughout Liberian society. Prior to this initiative, no forums for the discussion of such issues existed.40

There are various peer exchanges embedded in the EITI process, at both bilateral and multi-lateral levels. During these exchanges, MSG representatives from different countries meet to discuss results from EITI implementation and exchange best practices. Brynjar Wiersholm, EITI’s Finance Director, says that the EITI has become a global transparency tool and is now seen as a standard in itself. It allows participating governments to declare that they are transparent. At the same time, others also want to become members of this global transparency club. Reputation and status play an important role in this.41

There is evidence that member countries are undertaking active peer learning and exchange of best practices. For instance, in February 2014 representatives from Sierra Leone visited Liberia as part of a Peer-to-Peer Learning Visit. Some notable lessons learned by Sierra Leone representatives were: the autonomy of the Secretariat and the many effective approaches LEITI uses to communicate EITI to its citizens; the responsiveness of concessionaries in Western Liberia to fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities; and Liberia’s challenges and opportunities related to preparing the EITI Reconciliation Report.42

More recently, in 2017, at least two different EITI peer learning events took place. Representatives from ten African Anglophone and Lusophone countries met in November in Lusaka, Zambia, to share experiences. All delegations identified actions that they would carry out upon returning to their home countries.43 Latin American countries also held a peer learning event in December in Santo Domingo,  

40 Ibid.
Dominican Republic. The workshop focused on sharing lessons from Peru, the first country to implement the EITI in the region, Colombia, which recently strengthened its energy mining sector, Trinidad and Tobago, which was the first country to disclose social payments, and the host country itself, which innovated by publishing its first EITI report in a Transparency Portal, including key statistic data, in an open digital format.44

Awards and global recognition, as with the OGP, serve to encourage peer learning. The EITI has been giving awards every three years, with the most recent one going to the DRC for achievements in beneficial ownership disclosure, which refers to the identity of the real owners of companies that extract oil, gas, and minerals.45 Their identities are often unknown, hidden by a chain of corporate entities. However, they are often public officials or politically connected individuals. Subsequently, the DRC actively used this recognition to push its peers to follow its example.46

Rich highlights another example of a pilot project on beneficial ownership. While civil society stakeholders were interested, the EITI Secretariat did not have the capacity at the time to proceed with a full-scale project, so a limited pilot was implemented. Approximately ten countries, the majority of them African—including the DRC, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zambia—came on board. The EITI made sure to give recognition and credit to these states as well as to highlight best practices at the end. Although the pilot ended in 2015, 27 countries then started working on beneficial ownership. This is an example of peer learning used also for positive peer pressure in MSIs. Through regional training seminars, discussions, and exchanging lessons, member countries were able to encourage their peers to take this initiative on board.47

The EITI has peer pressure measures similar to the OGP’s to protect civil society space in participating countries. Civic space is first assessed when a country applies to join the EITI and when it is considered for the validation process. The EITI validation reviews the country’s progress against the EITI requirements, analyzes the impact of measures taken, and makes recommendations for strengthening the process and improving the governance of the sector.48 However, if at any point reports of harassment and intimidation of civil society surface, the EITI may call in the Rapid Response Committee to investigate. The EITI established this Committee in 2008, to “develop a proposed framework for EITI rapid responses to political developments.” Its mandate is concerned with monitoring events that could put EITI stakeholders or the process in implementing countries at risk. Should that happen, it provides recommendations to the EITI Board for possible action.49

Yet, despite its positive trajectory, the EITI still faces a number of challenges. Arguably, the most serious one is that its minimum standard is open to abuse. Compliance with the standard can be a mere exercise of ticking the right boxes and the dangers of “open-washing,” which refers to creating a façade of openness and consultation or compliance. In these instances, civil society is often involved on paper but not in practice. Civil society representatives may not be invited to meetings, or at least not to all of them; invitations to meetings may be sent without sufficient advance notice; and certain organizations that have a reputation for criticizing the government may be excluded. Finally, civil society inputs, suggestions, and recommendations may not be included in official documents. Countries can thus tick all of the right boxes in their EITI engagements without achieving any real change or accomplishing increased openness, transparency, and improved governance.

In attempting to solve these problems, two specific issues are important. First, the EITI is not just implemented by government but is also implemented by CSOs and the private sector. Yet, there is often a lack of expertise among CSOs working on these issues since they have limited capacity to interpret

46 Eddie Rich, op. cit.
47 Ibid.
information about financial flows from extractive industries. Where the regime is repressive and corrupt, the EITI can be the only platform available for dialogue or reform. However, in such environments, governments often intimidate participating CSOs. A case in point is Azerbaijan. Civil society in Azerbaijan complained about being threatened and excluded from playing a meaningful role in the country’s EITI process. Therefore, although Azerbaijan made meaningful progress in implementing the 2016 EITI Standard, the EITI suspended it in March 2017, due to lack of satisfactory progress on civil society engagement. The government of Azerbaijan decided to withdraw from the EITI a day later.50 Secondly, and similar to the APRM, there is often a lack of financial resources for implementing recommendations arising out of EITI reports. Financial constraints are a common problem, particularly in member states from the global south, and this slows down meaningful impact of the EITI process. For instance, although Ghana takes its membership in all three MSIs discussed in this project seriously, it did not complete many of the EITI projects emanating from recommendations due to funding limitations. These initiatives should encourage increased South-South Cooperation and triangular cooperation as part of peer support.

ENFORCING MSI COMMITMENTS

What happens when countries are not learning from their peers and peer pressure does not work? Given the voluntary nature of these MSIs, the answer is not much. It is important to remember that MSIs function on a non-adversarial basis and their membership consists of sovereign states. Therefore, countries that achieve the most through these platforms are the ones with the greatest political will to reform. However, each of the three MSIs discussed in this report has provisions for some sort of action against errant members. After all, it is important to keep high standards and discourage other countries from following the examples of non-compliant members.51

APRM

Criticisms of the APRM arise due to its non-coercive nature.52 The APRM has the power to put governments on notice of their intention to proceed with appropriate measures in the case of non-compliance. Such measures have never been introduced, however. In spite of warnings about the high probability of post-electoral violence in Kenya and violent incidences of xenophobia in South Africa raised in the respective APRM CRRs, the APRM did nothing to pre-empt the outbreak of violence in either case.53 The same can be said of APRM early warnings in Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda, among others. As a result, progress in achieving APRM goals has been slow, strong leadership is absent, participation is lacking, and recommendations are often not followed. The mechanism also does not envision tough sanctions for non-compliance, merely referring vaguely to “measures” countries should enact, although this has never been implemented in its 15-year existence. Mauritania is the only country the APRM has suspended, following a coup in 2008, when it was suspended from all AU activities. The APRM readmitted it the following year.

OGP

The OGP is more effective in bringing non-compliant members to order, although there are no hard sanctions. The MSI can render a member’s status as “inactive,” effectively suspending it. This happens if a complaint received by the Criteria and Standards Sub-Committee is determined to be of a valid nature. In May 2016 in Cape Town, Azerbaijan was declared inactive by vote of the OGP Steering Committee due to deteriorating human rights in that country, as was Turkey in September 2016. Gabriella Razzano,

51 The section on sanctions contained within the three MSIs is adapted from a Literature Review and Impact Assessment of APRM, EITI and OGP conducted by SAIIA from 2016-2018 (unpublished).
52 Ojienda T, op. cit.
a researcher at the Open Democracy Advice Centre, points out that “this is sourced from the unique nature of the OGP participation, which requires specific eligibility criteria to be fulfilled for participation. Substantive action taken by the member can therefore clearly be viewed to impinge on its participation.”

Effectively this is a naming and shaming sanction. Fear of losing status may encourage certain countries to comply but may not be a sufficient deterrent for others. Hungary, for example, announced its immediate withdrawal from the OGP in 2016 in response to an invitation by the OGP to discuss the deterioration of civil space in the country.

EITI

The EITI deals with errant countries by suspending or delisting them. A suspended country is given a status of being on “pause” if it has not made significant progress implementing EITI, if the political situation or conflict in the country does not allow EITI processes to advance meaningfully, or if the country breaches EITI Principles and Requirements. The more serious delisting revokes a country’s status as an EITI implementing country. Reasons for delisting include being suspended and not implementing corrective matters as recommended by the EITI Board, not making sufficient progress in implementing the EITI Standards within the stipulated timeframe, or failing to adhere to significant aspects of the EITI Principles and Requirements. Neither of the sanctions is irrevocable and the government of the suspended country may apply to lift the suspension or delisting at any time.

The EITI is also stricter towards its members than the APRM. According to EITI rules, “implementing countries are required to produce their first EITI Report within 18 months of being admitted as an EITI candidate. Thereafter, implementing countries are expected to produce EITI Reports on an annual basis.”

Table 2 below shows a list of countries previously suspended from EITI, as well as reasons for their suspensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reason for suspension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Suspended for political instability in 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Suspended for missing deadline in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Suspended due to inadequate progress in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>Suspended due to inadequate progress in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Suspended due to inadequate progress in 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Suspended due to inadequate progress in 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table compiled by the authors with data from https://eiti.org

57 EITI, op. cit.
Sanctions can be a sensitive matter. Tensions have arisen between African states and other EITI members on the issue of suspensions. Ghana is currently at risk of being sanctioned if it fails to address recommendations of the reports. Mainly, these are registration licenses, state participation, and issues relating to production and export data. When Azerbaijan was non-compliant, a number of African member states were asking why Azerbaijan was not suspended when other countries have been suspended for similar violations. Equal treatment of member states is important within an MSI. The same rules have to apply for everybody, irrespective of political clout, power, or status.

CONCLUSION

MSIs represent a new thinking in the international approach to governance. Bringing together governments, civil society, and, sometimes, business to one table is intended to create opportunities for dialogue, a forum for civil society to monitor government activity. Nevertheless, MSIs operate in countries with different governance practices and different political environments and thus it is crucial to establish formal mechanisms through which best practices can be identified and through which member states can share lessons. Although all three MSIs discussed have such formal mechanisms, only the OGP and EITI use them in practice. Furthermore, they use them on a number of levels, including bilateral, regional, and multilateral, while the APRM largely fails to do so.

A similar argument can be made for the concept of peer pressure. Both the OGP and EITI have dealt with recalcitrant members. The OGP did so for closing space for civil society and the EITI did so for similar offenses as well as for making inadequate progress in implementing its Standard. The APRM has never formally dealt with member countries that do the bare minimum, fail to comply with recommendations, or implement their National Programs of Action.

The role of civil society in MSIs cannot be underestimated. Checks and balances are crucial in any governance system but can be superficial when the executive is overly dominant. The OGP and the EITI have thus rightly drawn a red line on civil society participation. The APRM needs to learn from its counterparts and do the same, particularly in Egypt, whose government recently signed a law restricting the work of CSOs\textsuperscript{58} and wanted the term “civil society” removed from official APRM documentation when it started its review process.

The voluntary nature of these MSIs makes it difficult to bring errant members to account. Therefore, peer pressure and “naming and shaming” needs to be utilized more effectively – certainly a taboo in Africa. In order for sustained engagement to be achieved in the APRM, OGP, and EITI, member countries need to be committed and motivated to continue to engage. This requires ensuring that political leaders have a strong personal commitment to each process. In theory, MSIs can be effective to address complex large-scale problems. By bringing together different stakeholders with vested interests in outcomes and through introducing peer learning and peer pressure, MSIs can identify and implement solutions to governance challenges. The experience of both the OGP and EITI suggests that political will, evolution, and adaptability are all critical to the success of MSIs.\textsuperscript{59}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusions, we recommend the following:

1. Donor organizations should support the independent engagement of civil society in MSIs through training and creating opportunities for engagement, as CSOs often struggle to participate due to financial constraints and lack of capacity to engage on technical issues.

2. Donors should support peer learning activities, including training and experience sharing and documentation to boost MSI development. Regular platforms would highlight best practices and lessons, consider common elements of success and failure, and identify areas of research or services for mutual benefit.

3. Vest more power in MSI administrative bodies to make their processes more effective and efficient. Allow them to carry out tasks typically considered executive functions that can be neglected by leaders only attending a few meetings a year.

4. Appoint a good facilitator or political “champion” that is changed every few years to drive MSIs. This champion must deal with power dynamics and conflicts and integrate diverse perspectives and motivations into a safe space to encourage listening, co-creation, and innovation.

5. Outline the direct benefits and added value of MSIs to member countries to build vested interest. By building up belief in and commitment to accepted norms, the APRM, OGP, and EITI can create more compliance amongst member states.

6. Governments should facilitate and motivate companies’ compliance efforts by seeking out their views on laws and enforcement practices, to enhance the quality of the design and enforcement of law and regulations.

7. Engage civil society meaningfully at each stage of the processes in the APRM, OGP, and EITI. This will create support, encourage the exchange of new ideas, and help to build stronger institutions to make the processes work.